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Abstract: 
In our paper, we examined the relationship between non-performing loans, as a measure of 
stability, and concentration, as a measure of competition, in the Libyan banking sector. We 
used aggregate quarterly data for the 15 commercial banks in the country during the period 
2002-2013. A broad set of tests were conducted to measure the relationship between the two 
variables, and alternative robustness tests were conducted to assure our core finding that less 
competition in the banking sector leads to a more resilient banking sector. Thus, our results 
offer empirical support against “competition–stability” theory and conform to the 
“competition–fragility” literature. We conclude by recommending the need to inspect in more 
detail (on a bank by bank level) the relationship between competition and fragility in 
developing countries in general and in Libya in particular. 
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1. Introduction 
Finance institutions represent the grease that keeps every economy up and running, and this is 
why banks' behaviour and healthy functioning is of interest to both scholars and professionals. 
There has been enormous amount publications on the effect of competition in the sector on its 
stability. Unlike any other industry, a high level of competition is considered to be dangerous 
as it jeopardizes the stability of the sector by promoting risky behaviour. Consequently, there 
is almost a unified voice to the issue of finding the balanced formula between competition 
and stability. In this regard, Regulators always find themselves facing the dilemma of 
promoting financial stability by restricting competition in the sector by different means. 
Thus, there is a widespread view that permitting institutions to freely compete might 
endanger the sector's stability by leading to widespread panics and uncontrollable bank runs 
that can easily spread to the economy as a whole. Various financial turmoil's turned out to be 
more devastating than any other crisis in other sectors.  As result, we observe various national 
and international laws and regulations that lead to the limitation of the financial sector in 
general, and the banking sector in specific. The aim of these regulations is mainly to ensure 
the stability of the banking sector, and some argue that the most important job of regulators is 
to ensure the stability of the sector (Canoy 2001).  
The debate in this matter is still far from conclusive; some argue that, due to the small margin 
of profits in competitive environments, banks tend to take on risky investments and endanger 
the safety of the sector as a whole (Smith 1984). This study supports the view that a 
competitive banking sector tends to be more vulnerable than an uncompetitive one. Other 
papers, (Caminal and Matutes 2002), claim that banks with monopolistic powers are more 
prone to take on risky projects. They argue that these banks enjoy excess liquidity that might 
mislead them of their financial position and the danger of the projects that they normally 
finance. 
Measuring competition has taking various form, as we will see later on. The oldest 
measurement of competition is the level of concentration reflected in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. This procedure has been heavily criticized by the literature (Bikker 2004). 
Bikker claims that the level of concentration might be a misleading indicator for competition 
in small economies where the number of banks is relatively small. Most of the recent 
literature (Berger and others 2004) is now differentiating between the two terms, but none of 
those paper conducted analysis to measure the effect of competitive behaviour in the banking 
sector on its stability. Nevertheless, we notice that the these papers are including proxies for 
the regulatory environment that banks operate in.  
This paper should be the first one to shed light on this relationship in Libya, and possibly 
provoke the conduct of further studies on this issue. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. We review the relevant literature on the links between competition and 
concentration in part (2). A summary on the Banking sector in Libya and its development 
during the period of study is presented in part (3). A detailed explanation of the methodology 
that we're going to employ, including the Herfindahl Index, is presented in part (4).  In part (5) 
we present a summary of the data and it's descriptive statistics. Regression results and extra 
robustness tests are presented in section (6). Section (7) offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature review 
As we briefly touched on above, the literature on the effect of competition in the banking 
sector on its stability is divided into two streams. The old traditional view considers a 
competitive banking sector to be more prone to a crisis than a less competitive one. Becker 
(2010) supports this claim by using the profit variable as a mean of comparison. He claims 
that in a highly competitive sector the profit margin will be very small for banks, and this will 
encourage them to take on more risky investments and, thus, endanger the stability of the 
sector. Becker also claims that a sector with fewer and larger bank is easier to monitor than a 
highly competitive sector with a larger amount of bank. This ability to monitor and audit 
those small banks will ensure that the sector stays safe and more stable. In his claim, Becker 
states that small competitive banks are always at risk of small margin profits, and their 
franchise values are affected by those small margins. That will always incentives them to take 
on riskier projects to increase their profit margin and, thus, gain some market power. (Vives 
(2001) adds to that by noting that high competition in the banking sector increases the 
possibility of bank's failures that most likely will spread to the real sector and cause a 
significant social cost. This, in return, will have a negative effect on the confidence of the 
customers on the banking sector. Canoy (2001) supports the above by claiming that in a less 
competitive market big banks have a legacy to keep. He adds that the only way for these big 
banks to keep their legacy is to keep on operating and avoid any risky projects that might 
endanger the existence of their institutions. These banks comply to the "too big to fail" 
principle. 
 
In support to the above, Hellman, Mudroch, and Stiglitz (2000) show that a high level of 
competition incentivises financial institutions to take on riskier investment, but that an 
adequate capital requirement level and deposit rate ceilings can help restore cautious bank 
behaviour. Perotti and Suarez (2002) give more evidence to the competition-fragility 
literature. After they find that competition cause a less stable banking sector, they argue that, 
once banks start to go bankrupt, the authorities could encourage the existing banks to take 
over those banks and possibly gain some more market power. This approach is called the 
"last bank standing" approach. Perotti and Suarez conclude by their claim that the solution if 
a sector was competitive and it faced bank failures and instability would be for the regulators 
to promote takeovers of bankrupt institutions by existing banks, and that thus supports all of 
the above literature.     
On an opposing stand, Boyd and De Nicolo argue against the above claims. As they state that 
a less competitive banking sector where banks each control a large size of the market share 
are more is less stable than a more competitive one. Where big banks in this market can 
charge customers higher interest rates. Those higher interest rates are more harder to pay, and 
they also only attract entrepreneurs with riskier projects an increase in the adverse selection 
problem, which will endanger the sector as a whole. They also add that the solution to the 
claims against the competitive banking sectors, where the use of the bank's own money in 
financing should help the stability of the sector. Boyd and De Nicolo argue that less 
competitive banking sectors are more prone to instability than more competitive banking 
sectors, and they advocate against the Concentration-stability Theorem. 
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Also, Fischer and Chenard (1997) investigate the relationship between stability, regulation, 
and liberalization. They find in their study that deregulating the banking sector increases 
systemic risk, and they relate that to intensified competition in the period following the 
deregulation and an increase in competition in the banking system under examination. Thus, 
they conclude that a banking sector with higher entry barriers and less competition, and with 
more active restrictions is less fragile and more stable. 
   
Allen and Gale (2004), however, discuss that the effect of the degree of competition on the 
financial stability is many-sided and that a simple evaluation of the negative relationship 
between competition and stability is misleading. They review several articles related to the 
topic, and define the optimal level of competition resulting from each model. They conclude 
that all the models come with different results. They also find that, whenever deposit 
insurance is present or when banks start competing for deposits in the presence of increasing 
returns, competition between banks tends to weaken the health of the banking sector. Lastly, 
Allen and Gale draw attention to that fragility also depends on the structure of the interbank 
market. In this case, a small liquidity shock would spread faster and cause more damage in a 
competitive market where all banks are price takers. Similar to that paper, Boyd and others 
(2004) also argue that the banking crises depend on many other factors other than the level of 
competition in the banking sector of a certain country. 
On a related matter, if we take the design of deposit insurance schemes into consideration, 
Cordella and Yeyati (1998) show that risk-based deposit insurance restrains risk-taking 
behaviour of financial institutions even in the presence of increased competition. Rather, 
monetary policy is a major determinant as well. Monopolistic banking systems are found to 
be more fragile if the rate of inflation is below a certain threshold, whereas more competitive 
banking markets are more vulnerable if inflation is above this threshold. 
Schaeck (2006), ran a cross-country regression to evaluate how the competition affects the 
stability of the banking sector across 38 countries. Here we note that in further stages of the 
analysis, developing countries were excluded from the robustness tests for consistency 
reasons.  He claimed that including those countries would distort the estimation due to the 
heterogeneity between the banking sectors in developing countries and the ones in developed 
countries.  
Large degrees of government ownership, on the other hand, is accounted for in the literature 
and considered to hamper competitive when their share in those institutions is big. But some 
literature suggest a positive relationship between government ownership and time to crisis. 
However, empirical work by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) suggests that the relationship 
between government ownership and bank fragility is not that straight forward. 
In summary, we find that the literature on the relationship between competition and stability 
is far from conclusive. We find that the old dogma of a trade-off between competition and 
stability is challenged lately by various authors that we mentioned above. Nevertheless, 
empirical results are still wandering between those two views, and some of them even 
suggest that the relationship doesn't exist. Likewise, empirical research to date is largely 
dominated by studies on individual countries and mostly gives country-specific conclusions, 
which renders the literature and the findings drawn to date far from conclusive. 
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3. Libya's Banking Sector 
In the last decade, we notice an increase of interest in the banking sectors of developing 
countries. Nevertheless, a large part of the studies in the literature are studies concerned with 
developed markets. There is still, nevertheless, a few empirical studies on emerging markets. 
The level and determinants of competitiveness of the banking system in developed economies 
is different from those in emerging economies as noted by (Fungáčová 2010). Therefore, the 
competition policies and rules used for developed countries cannot be taken from the shelves 
and presented as a model for emerging markets. 
Similar to other countries in the region, the banking sector in Libya is the main provider of 
financial services to the economy. With 15 commercial banks totaling LYD 73.2 billion of 
assets (end of the end of 2013), the banking sector represents 81% of the total assets in the 
financial sector, as depicted in table (1). These banks can be subcategorized into 3 groups: 5 
large State-owned banks (including 2 banks with a 19% stake owned by foreign strategic 
partners), 8 private owned banks (including 3 with foreign participation of 49%), and 2 joint 
banks held by the Libyan Government (51%) and foreign States (UAE and Qatar). The first 
group collects 90% of the deposit base in Libya.  
 
Table 1: Overview of financial sector components 
Sector Total Assets (in billions) % of total assets 
Commercial Banks 73 81.0% 
Specialized Credit Institutions 12.2 13.5% 
Insurance Companies 0.8 0.9% 
Pension Funds 3.3 3.7% 
Stock Exchange 0.8 0.9% 
Sources: Central Bank of Libya 
Since commercial banks are the main institutions collecting Libyans’ savings, their deposit 
base has considerably expanded during the last 10 years. However, this expansion owns more 
to the growing pace of Government budget expenses, which is reflected more by the high oil 
prices during that period, than to an active deposits conquest policy. It is worth noting that 
despite the licensing of new banks (from 9 to 15 between 2003 and 13), the number of 
branches per 100,000 adults has not significantly increased (from 11 to 13). With a credit to 
GDP ratio of 12.4%, the intermediation of the Libyan banking sector is far below the regional, 
which adversely affects competitiveness. 
 
Financial Sector Liberalization 
The last 10 years have witnessed a number of measures to liberalize the financial sector and 
reshape the banking system and to increase its contribution to economic growth. We will 
mention some of the key measures that might had influence the structure of the banking 
sector in Libya, and they are: 
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- 2005: Liberalization of commercial banks’ fees for services provided to customers, 
requirement made for commercial banks to establish written credit policy, strengthening of 
CBL supervision of commercial banks, especially after the issuance of the Law nº 1 of 2005 
on banks. The end goal was to ensure the stability of economic activity, the financial safety of 
the banking system, as well as guaranteeing the rights of depositors. To achieve these goals, 
the Central Bank carries out inspections as well as off-site and on-site control of the operating 
commercial banks and their branches to ensure they comply with the provisions of the 
banking law and the decrees organizing banking activity. As part of Law nº 1 of 2005, two 
external auditors should review and audit banks’ accounts as well as their financial 
statements. 
- 2006: 15% of the Central Bank’s shares in two of the largest three banks in the country 
were offered to public subscription and the banks were listed on the Libyan Stock Market in 
the following year. 40 regional banks were merged into the National Banking Corporation 
which became itself a commercial bank. The CBL authorized the Boards of Directors of 
commercial banks to close bank branches or merge them with other branches. To allow banks 
to employ highly competent staff, banks were given the freedom to set the remunerations of 
their employees. Issuance of a regulation on large exposures (total credits and facilities 
granted to one single borrower shall not exceed 20% of regulatory capital). Issuance of a 
Circular allowing banks to grant credits and facilities to foreign companies that are 
implementing projects in Libya up to 50% of the cost of the project to be financed. 
- 2007: Inception of the Libyan Stock Market 
- 2008: Issuance of a Circular setting further limits on credit concentration and establishing 
standards for credit risk management. Issuance of a Circular delineating the duties of the 
board of directors and those of the executive management. 
We will use these dates to test for structural break in our models. Dummy variables can also 
contribute in evaluating the effect of government intervention. 
 
4. Methodology 
The NPLs is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. Where a higher ratio means that 
there's riskier loan portfolio in the bank level. This index will be our anchor for stability in 
the banking sector in Libya. 
 
We will employ the Herfindahl Index to measure the degree of concentration in the Libyan 
banking sector. This index has been widely calculated in many industries to calculate the 
level of concentration in those particular industries. Where the calculation takes the following 
form: 
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where si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms. The 
Herfindahl Index (H) ranges from 1/N  to one, where N is the number of firms in the market. 
The interpretation of the index should be as follows:  
- An H below 0.01 (or 100) indicates a highly competitive index. 
- An H below 0.15 (or 1,500) indicates an unconcentrated index. 
- An H between 0.15 to 0.25 (or 1,500 to 2,500) indicates moderate concentration. 
- An H above 0.25 (above 2,500) indicates high concentration. 
Here, we note that there is a variety of other indices that are widely used to assess both the 
competition and stability of the banking sector. To name a few of these possible indices, and 
the reason why they were irrelevant to our analysis: 
- The Lerner index, which describes a firm market power. It is defined by: 
 
Where P is the market price set by the firm, in our case it would be the interest rate opposed 
by commercial banks on their customers, and MC is the firm marginal cost. The index ranges 
from a high of 1 to a low of 0, with higher numbers implying greater market power. For a 
perfectly competitive firm (where P=MC), L=0; such a firm has no market power. 
Despite the superiority of the index, it was excluded from our analysis for various reasons: i) 
the inconsistency of income statements reported by commercial banks to the Central Bank of 
Libya; ii) the entry of almost 7 new banks to the sector, and the ongoing mergence of banks 
might give misleading indicators, as noted by some officials at the Central Bank of Libya. 
 
- H-Statistic: 
The H-Statistic was created to diagnose which level of competition the market was in. recent 
papers (Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Bikker (2004)) have emphasized on the superiority of 
this index in measuring the level of competition than other previously used indices. These 
studies argue that the analytical superiority of the H-Statistic over previously used measures 
of competition is due to its formal derivation from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions. 
Moreover, the statistic is robust with respect to the market since it only draws upon 
characteristics of reduced-form revenue equations at the firm level. Nevertheless, its 
limitation lies in the fact that the inferences based on the statistic are only valid if the market 
is in (or close to) equilibrium. 
In the analysis, we will test for the stationary of the data to determine which model fits the 
data best, and will follow by cointegration tests to measure if the relationship between the 
variables is only temporary or permanent. Afterwards, we will test for structural breaks in the 
model using the Quandt & Andrews estimator to detect these breaks without knowing or 
assuming their period. Implementing shocks will also be useful for our analysis to measure 
the persistence of the effect of a shock in the covariate on the variable of interest. 
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5. Data and summary statistics 
We focus in the empirical analysis on a set of 15 banks during the period 2002-2013 using 
quarterly data. We include in our analysis a set of macroeconomic variables that are expected 
to have effect on the NPL index. In this case, we will be able refine the model and pursue to 
measure the relationship of interest while controlling for other variable. In what follows, is 
the list of the added variables and their expected signs in the model: 
- The coverage of foreign assets to money supply FA/MS: This variable is a large indicator 
of how much the monetary authority can protect the financial sector in general and the 
banking sector and the exchange rate in particular especially in developing countries. We're 
expecting a negative coefficient for this variable, but, nevertheless, it could also produce a 
negative coefficient depending on the characteristics of each banking sector. 
- Credit to the economy: we are including this variable as the aggregate credit granted by the 
banking sector in Libya to different agents in the economy. The sign of the coefficient should 
be negative for this variable, where granting more credit will inflate the denominator in the 
NPL ratio and will decrease the ratio as a whole. 
- Inflation rate: the sign of the inflation rate should be positive. As an increase in the 
inflation rate will encourage banks to raise interest rates, and that will only encourage risky 
borrowers. 
Descriptive statistics for the entire set of variables are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
          
  Mean Std.Dev Maximum Minimum 
NPL 25.2 4.91 35.5 17 
Concentration 0.21 0.025 0.26 0.17 
FA/MS 2.8 0.67 4.3 1.7 
Credit 6,707.6 2,505.5 13,163.2 4,298.0 
Inflation rate 3.5 7.1 26.9 -9.1 
 
        
                          Source: Author's calculation based on data from the CBL 
 
Correlation matrix  
The correlation matrix will enable us to assess the correlation between the covariates and the 
variable of interest (NPL). The direction of the relationships should be indicated as well in 
the below table: 
 
Table 3: Correlation and covariance Between Variables 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      Correlation     
 CONCENTRATION COV CREDIT INFLATION NPL 
CONCENTRATION  (0.000599)     
 1.000000     
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COV  （-0.003493） （0.446066）    
 -0.213656 1.000000    
CREDIT  （44.74553） （-112.8765） （6146715.）   
 0.737237 -0.068168 1.000000   
      
INFLATION  （0.000538） （0.014232） （46.41028） （0.004918）  
 0.313258 0.303873 0.266938 1.000000  
      
NPL  （-0.000987） （-0.003914） （-90.83514） （-0.001154） （0.002360） 
 -0.830369 -0.120635 -0.754232 -0.338805 1.000000 
      
       
Source: Author's calculation.  
Terms in the brackets represent covariance between the variables. 
Table 3 gives us the first indication of the correlation between all the variables in the model. 
We first highlight the analysis on coefficients related to the NPL variable; The coefficients of 
credit and the ratio of foreign reserves to money supply turned up with signs that were 
anticipated in the analysis above, on one hand. On the other hand, the sign of the inflation 
variable turned out with a conflicting sign than the one we anticipated. This might be 
attributed to the stability of the nominal interest rates charged by the commercial banks in 
Libya during the period of study. Nevertheless, further analysis will be conducted below to 
verify the significance of that result in the model. Also, we notice that the correlation sign of 
the relationship between the concentration variable and the NPL variable is negative, 
indicating that the decline in competition helped in assuring the stability of the banking sector. 
This might be a strong argument for the mergers of small banks that was promoted by the 
Central Bank of Libya in order to enhance the quality of human capital in the sector. But, as 
noted above, further testing will be implemented to verify these preliminary results. 
We also notice a positive relationship between the concentration rate and the amount of credit 
granted to the domestic economy. This might be attributed to various reasons, including the 
expansionary fiscal policy that took place in this period, which in return provided the banking 
sector with large amounts of excess reserves. Also, inflation had a positive correlation with 
all the other variables that are in the model. Since the direction of the relationship is not clear 
at the moment, these signs have solid interpretation behind them given the high oil prices and 
the expansionary policies conducted in that period. 
Normality 
The next thing we are going to check for is the normality of the distribution of the 
Nonperforming Loans (NPL). It is likely to be normal.  The histogram of the series is going 
to be plotted in order to see the distribution of the data. We employ the Jarque Bare test 
which is computed as:  
             
where S is the skewness and K the kurtosis. 
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Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics of NPL 
 
       Source: Author's calculation.  
 
As the p-value associated with the test 0.311185 is smaller than the significance level, we 
don't have statistically significant evidence to reject the null of normality. The  Jarque Bera 
test follows asymptotically a chi-squared distribution. 
 
Graphical Analysis 
Figure 2: Evolution of NPL & Concentration 
 
                                           Source: Author's calculation.  
 
Graph 2 plots the evolution of the NPL variable and the concentration variable. It's shown 
that the two series move in opposite directions, as indicated above in the correlation matrix 
table. We also note that the relationship changed during the period of reform (Q 02 2004- Q 
02 2006). This may lead us to think that there was a possibility of a structural change 
occurring during that period. Just by observation, we cannot judge if these two time series are 
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stationary or not. Running the test for unit roots will enable us to determine whether these 
two series are stationary or not. This procedure will also be implemented on the other 
variables of the model. 
 
Testing for stationarity in the series: 
In this test we employ the  Dickey-Fuller statistic. The regression model for the test can be 
written as follows: 
 
 
 
The null and the alternative to this test are stated as: 
 
H0: δ=o There is unit root 
 H : δ<o No unit root 
The test statistic is:  t = (/ se())  
 
After adding a drift to our analysis, we found strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
the series suffering from a unit root regarding 4 variables (NPL, COV,  Inflation, 
Concentration) at the I(0) level. While we found that the credit variable wasn't stationary at 
that level. The credit variable was stationary at the first difference level I(1). The detailed 
results are available in (appendix I). 
 
Cointegration results: 
We run a cointegration test on the two variables of interest (NPL, Concentration) to test if 
there exist a long-term relationship between the two. Using the cointegration assumption of a 
deterministic trend, the resulting Trace statistic and the max-Eigen statistic strongly rejected 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the two variables. Both statistics indicate that 
there is at least one cointegration equilibrium between the two variables (see appendix II).  
 
6. Regression Results 
 
Table 4: Regression Results 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.649837 0.042966 15.12448 0.0000 
COV -0.022375 0.005390 -4.151355 0.0002 
CONCENTRATION -1.435985 0.207947 -6.905516 0.0000 
INFLATION 0.034227 0.052402 0.653152 0.5171 
D(CREDIT) -4.99E-06 1.93E-06 -2.590824 0.0130 
     
     R-squared 0.813521    Mean dependent var 0.251704 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796174    S.D. dependent var 0.049091 
S.E. of regression 0.022163    Akaike info criterion -4.682452 
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Sum squared resid 0.021122    Schwarz criterion -4.487535 
Log likelihood 117.3788    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.608792 
F-statistic 46.89731    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
                          Source: Author's calculation.  
 
The main Results of our regression model are presented in Table (4). The coefficients 
obtained from the model are reported in Specification along with their T-statistics and their 
significance level as well. Some complementary data is also shown in the table.  The 
regression results show with signs that are consistent with the previous analysis that was 
conducted above. 
We find that the concentration level (lack of competition) has a positive effect on the stability 
of the banking sector. The coefficient of the concentration variable is significant at the 1% 
level, and shows that whenever concentration increases by 1 percent this will lead to a 
reduction of NPL by 1.4 percent. 
 Also, the Foreign assets to money supply ratio (COV) variable has a negative sign as well. 
This leads us to presume that the healthier the sector is the more the borrowers and lenders 
are willing to renegotiate and restructure the debt term. Nevertheless, this might just be a 
country-specific phenomenon, and we cannot affirm this analysis without additional testing.  
Credit granted to the economy shows with the expected sign and is also significant. However, 
as noted above this result is quite symmetric were credit constitutes the denominator of the 
NPL index and an increase in the denominator will directly lead to a decline in the ratio. We 
also note that the small size of the coefficient is attributed to the fact that we are regressing a 
ratio on an absolute variable. 
The inflation rate coefficient turned out to be consistent with our previous results, having a 
negative sign. Nevertheless, it is insignificant.  The lack of significance of some of the 
macroeconomic control variables (inflation) might be attributable to multicollinearity. Similar 
results were found in the study by Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001). We choose to keep 
them in the equation to test our hypothesis regarding the relationship between competition 
and stability in the banking sector while the macroeconomic setting is controlled for and to 
capture the behaviour of the macroeconomic environment more dynamically. 
We perform several robustness tests employing structural breaks tests on the residuals. We 
also perform an Impulse response test to measure to what extent and how long a shock in the 
concentration rate affects the behaviour of the NPL variable. In addition, we try to detect the 
presence of seasonal behaviour in the NPL variable which might give us more insight on its 
development. 
First we start with a structural break test to see if the relationship has changed between the 
NPL variable and the concentration variable. As we have indicated earlier, there are some 
periods where we expect to have a large impact on the banking sector in Libya. Nevertheless, 
in our analysis for the structural break test we will first employ the Quandt and Andrews 
methodology of unknown structural breaks. Doing so will prevent us from predetermining 
when the structural change occurred, if ever. 
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Table 5: Quandt & Andrews Structural Break Test 
    
    Statistic Value    Prob.   
    
    Maximum LR F-statistic (2006Q1) 14.44658  0.0000 
Maximum Wald F-statistic (2006Q1) 28.89316  0.0000 
Exp LR F-statistic 4.995995  0.0001 
Exp Wald F-statistic 11.79133  0.0001 
Ave LR F-statistic 6.041549  0.0005 
Ave Wald F-statistic 12.08310  0.0005 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within 15% trimmed data 
Varying regressors: C CONCENTRATION 
Equation Sample: 2002Q1 2013Q4 
Test Sample: 2004Q1 2012Q1 
Number of breaks compared: 33 
 
All three tests of the Quandt and Andrews test indicate that there is a structural break in the 
data, with high probability. In addition, the first results indicate that the most probable 
structural point in the data is 01Q2006. This date goes in line with our first analysis of the 
reform measures that were taken during the period under examination. We also test the 
proposed structural point using the Chow structural break test for assurance,  and the results 
affirm those in the Quandt and Andrews results (see appendix II). 
Next, we impose a shock on the concentration variable and see what is the effect of such 
shock on the NPL's variable. In practice, a 5 percent shock to the concentration variable could 
be the acquisition of a medium-size bank by a big bank. Since our analysis is mainly 
concerned with the aggregate data, we will not make any further assumption.  
 
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function 
   Source: Author's calculation.  
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Given the goals of this analysis, we will only focus on the Upper-left graph. Here we notice 
that a positive shock on the concentration will lead to a permanent decline in the NPL ratio 
by almost 1 percent. This result also comes in support to our pervious findings on the 
negative effect of concentration on the NPL ratio. 
Lastly, we try to detect any seasonal patterns in the NPL's ratio variable. As shown in graph 
(4), we noticed a magnifying factor in the fourth quarter data. This can be explained by the 
fact that commercial banks in general, and government-owned banks in specific, were used to 
negotiating the restructure of loans and the repayment settlements by the end of each year. 
Nevertheless, we notice that this phenomenon started to die out by the end of the sample 
period. We also ran a regression of the seasonally adjusted NPL variable, and found out that 
the results were similar to the ones obtained from the original model. Details of the new 
model can be found in (appendix IV). 
 
Figure 4: Seasonal Factor of NPL 
 
                       Source: Author's calculation.  
 
 
7. Conclusion and policy implication. 
In our paper, we examined the relationship between Non-perfuming loans, as a measure of 
stability, and concentration, as a measure of competition, in the Libyan banking sector. We 
used aggregate quarterly data for the 15 commercial banks in the country during the period 
2002-2013. A broad set of tests were conducted to measure the relationship between the two 
variables, and alternative robustness tests were conducted to assure our core finding that less 
competition in the banking sector leads to a more resilient banking sector. Thus, our results 
offer empirical support against “competition–stability” theory and conforms to the 
“competition–fragility” literature.  
Also, we recommend the need to inspect in more detail (on a bank by bank level) the 
relationship between competition and fragility in developing countries in general, and in 
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Libya in particular. It is important to examine if alternative measures of competitive 
behaviour confirm our initial results and which levels of competition, if any, may be optimal 
to maintain a stable banking system.  
In conclusion, we note that more detailed data on the banking sector in Libya would yield 
more fruitful analysis. Given the heterogeneous nature of the banking sector in Libya, it 
would be more beneficial to conduct the analysis on a bank by bank level. Comparison 
studies of "Big Vs. Small", Government-owned Vs. Private, and Domestic Vs. Foreign gives 
more in-depth on the structure of the banking sector, especially in developing countries.   
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8- Appendices  
Appendix I 
Null Hypothesis: NPL has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.326779  0.0193 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: INFLATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.853915  0.0048 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
17 
 
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
This time-series is I(0). 
  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: CONCENTRATION has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.410859  0.0156 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Null Hypothesis: D(CREDIT) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.202995  0.0018 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
foreign assets to Money supply ratio 
 
Null Hypothesis: COV  has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.945584  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
 
Appendix II 
Cointegration test between the concentration level and the Non-performing loans: 
 
Date: 03/09/15   Time: 19:34   
Sample (adjusted): 2002Q4 2013Q4   
Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
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Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: NPL CONCENTRATION    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.266909  17.54141  15.49471  0.0243 
At most 1  0.076259  3.569538  3.841466  0.0588 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.266909  13.97187  14.26460  0.0555 
At most 1  0.076259  3.569538  3.841466  0.0588 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Appendix III 
 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2006Q1   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: C COV CONCENTRATION INFLATION CREDIT  
Equation Sample: 2002Q1 2013Q4  
     
     F-statistic 6.077124  Prob. F(5,37) 0.0003 
Log likelihood ratio 28.77666  Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic  30.38562  Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0000 
     
 
Appendix IV 
Dependent Variable: NPL_SA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/09/15   Time: 20:41   
Sample: 2002Q1 2013Q4   
Included observations: 48   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.649833 0.042985 15.11781 0.0000 
COV -0.022367 0.005392 -4.147948 0.0002 
CONCENTRATION -1.436175 0.208038 -6.903437 0.0000 
CREDIT -4.99E-06 1.93E-06 -2.588187 0.0131 
INFLATION 0.034179 0.052425 0.651969 0.5179 
     
     R-squared 0.813381    Mean dependent var 0.251701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796021    S.D. dependent var 0.049094 
S.E. of regression 0.022173    Akaike info criterion -4.681584 
Sum squared resid 0.021140    Schwarz criterion -4.486668 
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Log likelihood 117.3580    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.607925 
F-statistic 46.85389    Durbin-Watson stat 0.319843 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
